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Abstract²Risk identification and risk estimation are 
important stages of any risk management process. Existing 
research in Supply chain risk management has mainly focused on 
these two stages whereas risk evaluation has not been fully 
explored which is an equally significant stage involving 
evaluation of different risk mitigation strategies. The main 
purpose of this paper is to propose a method of evaluating 
different mitigation strategies through cost and benefit analysis. 
The proposed method introduces a unique concept of integrating 
cost and relative impact of different combinations of mitigation 
strategies within a network setting of interconnected risk 
triggers, risk factors and risk mitigation strategies. We have 
applied our method on a case study that was conducted in an 
aerospace supply chain. Our approach is useful in identifying an 
optimal combination of mitigation strategies against a given 
budget constraint. Furthermore, the model can also be used for 
determining such strategies in relation to a given level of risk 
exposure. We have incorporated NoisyOR function within the 
Bayesian Network model in order to reduce the complexity 
involved in eliciting a huge number of conditional probability 
values. 
Keywords²Supply chain risk management; risk evaluation; 
risk mitigation strategies; NoisyOR function 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Risk management is an established field in some areas of 
organizational life like finance but it is still a developing theme 
within the realm of supply chain management [1]. There is a 
consensus among researchers on treating risk management as a 
process comprising three stages of risk identification, risk 
estimation and risk evaluation [2].  
6XSSO\&KDLQ5LVN0DQDJHPHQW6&50LVGHILQHGDV³WKH
management of supply chain risks through coordination or 
collaboration among the supply chain partners so as to ensure 
SURILWDELOLW\ DQG FRQWLQXLW\´ [3]. Supply chain risks can be 
YLHZHG ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKUHH EURDG SHUVSHFWLYHV D µEXWWHUIO\¶
concept that segregates the causes, risk events and the ultimate 
impact, the categorization of risks with respect to the resulting 
impact in terms of delays and disruptions and network based 
classification in terms of local-and-global causes and local-and-
global effects [4]. 
 It is important to realize that risk exists at various levels, 
inside the focal company and at the network level. 
)XUWKHUPRUH ULVN HYDOXDWLRQ GHSHQGV RQ WKH VWDNHKROGHU¶V
perspective and therefore, the subjective judgement of a 
particular stakeholder determines what constitutes a risk and 
what level of risk is acceptable [5]. 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is a probabilistic graphical 
model that represents causal relationship between variables and 
captures uncertainty in dependency in terms of conditional 
probabilities [6, 7]. BBNs have been used in modelling supply 
chain risks and found to be an effective technique, however, 
the scope of such models has been limited to focused areas like 
supplier selection, risk profiling, etc. [8-10]. We make use of 
the BBNs in capturing interdependency between supply chain 
risks and modelling the interaction of mitigation strategies with 
associated risks taking into account the relative cost and benefit 
of such strategies. As the number of conditional probability 
values grows exponentially with the increase in number of 
causal factors for a risk, we utilize the concept of NoisyOR 
function in order to reduce the number of values from 
exponential to linear. 
Research Problem and Contribution 
Existing research in SCRM has mainly focused on the first 
two stages of risk management process; risk identification and 
risk estimation. In general, risk mitigation strategies have been 
described qualitatively and no study has investigated 
evaluation of risk mitigation strategies within a network setting 
of interconnected risks, triggers, consequences and mitigation 
strategies on the basis of cost and benefit analysis. This 
research paper is a first step towards bridging this major 
research gap. It attempts to propose a method that can help 
researchers and practitioners appreciate the importance of risk 
evaluation and develop better models for managing supply 
chain risks. 
Outline 
Literature review is briefly presented in Section II. BBNs 
and NoisyOR function are described in Section III. Section IV 
describes our proposed method of evaluating control strategies 
followed by its demonstration as a Case Study in Section V. 
Results and managerial implications are discussed in Section 
VI followed by the conclusion and future research presented in 
Section VII. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Risk has been defined as a chance of danger, damage, loss, 
injury or any other undesired consequences [11]. According to 
Knight [12], risk is something measurable in a way that 
probabilities of the outcomes can be estimated whereas, 
uncertainty is not quantifiable and probabilities of the possible 
outcomes are not known. According to Jüttner et al. [13], 
³6&50DLPVWRLGHQWLI\WKHSRWHQWLDOVRXUFHVRIVXSSO\FKDLQ
risks and implement appropriate actions to avoid or contain 
VXSSO\ FKDLQ YXOQHUDELOLW\´ 9XOQHUDELOLW\ LV GHILQHG DV DQ
exposure to serious disturbances from risks within the Supply 
Chain as well as risks external to the Supply Chain [14]. 
Simulation has been extensively used by researchers in 
modelling supply chain risks. Simulation techniques used in 
the realm of SCRM include agent-based modelling [15], Monte 
Carlo simulation [16, 17], discrete event simulation [18], 
system dynamics modelling [19] and Petri-Net simulation [20]. 
Generally, the existing studies have either focused on 
addressing a specific problem or considered risks as 
independent factors. Risk mitigation strategies have not been 
evaluated within the network of interconnected risks and 
strategies and therefore, existing models fail to capture a 
holistic account of all three stages of risk management process 
incorporating interdependence between all factors.  
Many researchers have proposed proactive mitigation 
strategies while limited studies have focused on reactive 
strategies [21-24]. Wieland [25] developed mathematical 
models for determining optimal solution and break-even points 
in the realm of four strategies-agility, robustness, resilience and 
rigidity. Multi-criteria decision making [26, 27] and stochastic 
programming [28-31] have also been utilized for assessing 
supply chain risks. 
According to Johnson [32], capacity risks can be reduced 
by outsourcing and building a flexible web of partners whereas, 
operational hedging can help in reducing currency and political 
risks. Christopher and Lee [3] proposed strategies of 
information accuracy, visibility, accessibility and responsive 
corrective actions. Zsidisin et al. [33] recommended 
implementation of supplier improvement programs and 
mitigation of supply disruptions through creating business 
interruption plans, developing demand forecasts and modelling 
supply processes. Blackhurst  et al. [34] emphasized the 
significance of real-time sharing of correct information from 
every node in the supply chain and predicting capacity 
bottlenecks in global transportation networks. According to 
Kleindorfer and Saad [35], approaches used to mitigate 
disruption risks must fit the characteristics and needs of the 
underlying environment of the focal supply chain. 
Sinha et al. [36] introduced a comprehensive risk 
management process for mitigating supplier risks in an 
aerospace supply chain. Their method links risk triggers to 
corresponding risk factors and helps in identifying risk 
mitigation strategies, however, they did not consider the cost 
and benefit associated with implementing these strategies. 
Tummala and Schoenherr [37] introduced a Supply Chain Risk 
Management Process (SCRMP) and proposed allocating 
resources to the important risk factors. They assigned 
cumulative score to each risk factor on the basis of its 
probability, impact and risk control cost. However, they did not 
consider the uncertainty involved in risk mitigation. 
Furthermore, they did not capture the interdependent nature of 
strategies, risk triggers and risk factors. 
III. BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORKS 
BBN is an acyclic directed graphical model comprising 
nodes representing uncertain variables and arcs indicating 
causal relationships between variables whereas the strength of 
dependency is represented by the conditional probability values 
[6]. BBNs have started gaining the interest of researchers in 
modelling supply chain risks [38]. BBNs offer a unique feature 
of modelling risks combining both the statistical data and 
subjective judgment in case of non-availability of data [39, 40]. 
Researchers have used the BBNs to model specific domains of 
supply chain risks and validated these models through case 
studies. The existing BBN based models in SCRM have mainly 
focused on evaluating risks on the basis of probabilistic 
interdependency exclusively; however, it is equally important 
to consider the loss values corresponding to different risks and 
the cost and benefit associated with each mitigation strategy 
and to include all these factors into the model itself. We aim to 
utilize the efficacy of BBNs in dealing with uncertainties and 
modelling all three stages of SCRM process. 
The number of conditional probability values increases 
exponentially with the increase in number of parent nodes 
leading to complexity involved in eliciting these probabilities, 
therefore, it is important to consider incorporating assumptions 
in the model in order to cope with this problem. NoisyOR 
function is a useful tool that simplifies the problem and 
necessitates eliciting only ݊ ൅  ?  parameters where n represents 
the number of parent nodes of a child node [41]. 
NoisyOR Function 
Let ܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܥ௡be binary variables indicating all the causes of 
a binary risk variable ܴ. Each event ܥ௜ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ causes ܴ ൌܶݎݑ݁ unless an inhibitor prevents it with probability of ݍ௜ [42]. 
 ܲሺܴ ൌ ܨ݈ܽݏ݁ȁܥ௜ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ሻ ൌ ݍ௜ (1) 
Assuming all inhibitors as independent, 
 
ܲሺܴ ൌ ܨ݈ܽݏ݁ȁܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܥ௡ሻ ൌ ෑ ݍ௝௝א்  (2) 
where  is the set of indices for variables in the state ԢԢ. 
If ܲሺܴ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ȁܥଵ ൌ ڮ ൌ ܥ௡ ൌ ܨ݈ܽݏ݁ሻ ൐  ? , then leak factor 
can be incorporated into the model representing a background 
event that is always on. 
IV. PROPOSED METHOD 
Our proposed method is a first step towards integrating the 
three stages of SCRM process within the modelling framework 
of BBNs. We do not follow the process flow of a supply chain 
as it might not be feasible to model a huge network. The 
method comprises three main stages of problem structuring, 
instantiation and inference as shown in Fig. 1. 
Problem Structuring 
This stage comprises important steps of identifying key 
supply chain risks, associated risk triggers and mitigation 
strategies, developing the network structure and expressing 
nodes as statistical variables. The problem owner needs to 
ensure that the model is developed to represent the real 
problem. Furthermore, the model builder can assist in 
structuring the model keeping in view the mechanics of a BBN. 
Instantiation 
This stage involves evaluation of (conditional) probabilities 
either through elicitation from the experts or extraction from 
the data. Probability elicitation is the most difficult task of the 
modelling process as the experts find it challenging to describe 
the conditional probabilities. As the values grow exponentially 
with the increase in number of parents of a child node, 
therefore, we introduce the NoisyOR function in order to 
reduce the number of such values from exponential to linear. In 
this stage, the loss corresponding to each risk trigger is also 
ascertained followed by the evaluation of cost associated with 
different mitigation strategies.  
Inference 
In this stage, key risk triggers are identified after 
propagating conditional probability and loss values across the 
interconnected risk factors, triggers and mitigation strategies. 
The values from the network are exported to Microsoft Excel 
for conducting cost and benefit analysis of various 
combinations of mitigation strategies. Depending on the risk 
tolerance of the stakeholder, appropriate strategies are selected 
for implementation. 
V. CASE STUDY 
We apply our proposed method on a case study presented 
by Sinha et al. [36]. They had applied their methodology on an 
aerospace supplier specializing in machined parts. After 
identifying key risk factors for the supplier and using the 
failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), they were able to 
determine potential failure modes and recommend corrective 
actions. We have transformed their FMEA representation into 
risk factors, triggers and mitigation strategies as shown in 
Table I. Conditional probability values for risk triggers and risk 
factors are shown in Appendix A whereas loss values for risk 
triggers and costs associated with different mitigation strategies 
are presented in Appendices B and C respectively. In contrast 
to the use of ordinal scales for occurrence and severity in 
FMEA, we make use of the probability and loss values in our 
model. Therefore, we have mapped the values for occurrence 
and severity used in the case study [36] to the parameters of 
probability and loss respectively. Furthermore, as the case 
study [36] had not considered the uncertainty associated with 
the interaction between risk triggers and risks, we have 
assumed the values for quantification of the NoisyOR function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Cost and benefit based method of evaluating risk mitigation strategies. 
 
Problem 
Structuring 
Instantiation 
Inference 
Identify key supply chain risks 
Identify risk triggers and mitigation strategies 
Build network and express as statistical variables 
Specify conditional probability and loss values 
Specify relative cost of each mitigation strategy 
Propagate and identify important risk triggers 
Conduct Cost and Benefit analysis 
Determine appropriate mitigation strategies 
TABLE I.  RISK FACTORS, RISK TRIGGERS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (ADAPTED FROM [36]) 
Risk Factor Risk Trigger Mitigation Strategy 
Failure to deliver on time (R1) 
Machine breakdown (T1) Effective maintenance (M1) 
Non-availability of raw material (T2) Visibility of demand to vendor (M2) 
Labour problems (T3) Proper company culture (M3) 
Improperly trained workers (T4) Training (M4) 
1DWXUDOFDODPLW\DWYHQGRU¶VSODFH (T5)  
Failure to communicate (T6) Communication tools (M5) 
Poor quality of incoming material (R2) 
/RZTXDOLW\PDWHULDOXVHGDWYHQGRU¶VIDFLOLWLHV (T7) Selecting the right quality material (M6) 
,PSURSHUSURFHVVDWWKHYHQGRU¶VHQG (T8) Supplier assessment (M7) 
Insufficient use of quality tools (T9) Using correct quality programs (M8) 
Improperly trained workers (T4) Training (M4) 
Eroding market share (R3) 
No clear market perception (T10) Mass customization (M9) 
Poor after-service network (T11) Good contact with customer (M10) 
Not using the latest technology (T12) Implementing the best technology (M11) 
High product cost (T13) As per prevailing market conditions (M12) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Risk factors, risk triggers and mitigation strategies modelled as a BBN. 
 
BBN based model was developed in GeNIe [43] as shown 
in Fig. 2. Each mitigation strategy appears as a rectangular 
QRGHKDYLQJELQDU\VWDWHVRIµ<HV (Y)¶DQGµ1R (N)¶(DFKULVk 
factor/trigger is represented by an oval node having binary 
VWDWHV RI µ7UXH (T)¶ DQG µ)DOVH (F)¶ 5LVN H[SRVXUH RI HDFK
trigger is represented by a diamond node. Risk exposure values 
of all the triggers corresponding to each risk factor are 
aggregated through NosiyOR function and finally, the overall 
risk exposure is calculated through aggregating risk exposure 
values across all three risk factors.  
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Once the Bayesian network was updated, risk exposure 
values for the risk triggers were evaluated as shown in Table II. 
µ1RFOHDUPDUNHWSHUFHSWLRQ¶SURYHGWREHWKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQW
risk trigger and keeping in view the low probability and loss 
values DVVRFLDWHGZLWKµ1DWXUDOFDODPLW\DWYHQGRU¶VSODFH¶LWV
risk exposure was insignificantµ0DFKLQHEUHDNGRZQ¶ZDVDOVR
an important trigger having a high value of risk exposure. 
Array of loss exposure values corresponding to different 
combinations of mitigation strategies was exported to 
Microsoft Excel. Furthermore, another array of costs associated 
with these strategies was generated in GeNIe and subsequently 
exported to Microsoft Excel. The resulting graph representing 
cost and benefit analysis of different combinations of 
mitigation strategies is shown in Fig. 3. Data points displayed 
in blue colour represent the variation in risk exposure with that 
of the cost associated with different strategies. It is important to 
note that there is a substantial decrease in risk exposure with 
slight increase in mitigation cost, however, the rate of this 
decrement reduces with an increase in mitigation cost. Data 
points displayed in red colour indicate the improvement in risk 
exposure incorporating the cost of implementing strategies. All 
such data points having non-negative values can be considered 
as appropriate combinations of strategies from the perspective 
of a risk-neutral decision maker because we have considered 
expected values in our model. 
 
TABLE II.  RISK EXPOSURE VALUES FOR RISK TRIGGERS 
Risk Trigger Risk Exposure 
Machine breakdown 51.98 
Non-availability of raw material 9.9 
Labour problems 0.44 
Improperly trained workers  18.7 
1DWXUDOFDODPLW\DWYHQGRU¶VSODFH 0.01 
Failure to communicate 24.75 
/RZTXDOLW\PDWHULDOXVHGDWYHQGRU¶VIDFLOLWLHV 5.45 
,PSURSHUSURFHVVDWWKHYHQGRU¶VHQG 31.35 
Insufficient use of quality tools 16.5 
Improperly trained workers 18.7 
No clear market perception 97.01 
Poor after-service network 21.24 
Not using the latest technology 46.2 
High product cost 13.2 
 
 
Fig. 3. Cost and benefit analysis of various combinations of mitigation 
strategies. 
It is also important to differentiate between the optimal and 
inefficient combinations of strategies. Depending on risk 
tolerance of the stakeholder, specific levels of risk exposure 
can be achieved through implementing cost-effective 
mitigation strategies as shown in Fig. 4. For each level of risk 
exposure, there are a number of possible combinations of 
strategies, however, there is a unique cost-efficient 
combination represented by the lowest value. 
The model can also be used to segregate risk mitigation 
strategies on the basis of controllability. It might be difficult to 
monitor certain mitigation strategies if these are not directly 
LPSOHPHQWHG E\ WKH VWDNHKROGHU µ8VLQJ FRUUHFW TXDOLW\
SURJUDPV¶ DQG µVHOHFWLQJ WKH ULJKW TXDOLW\ PDWHULDO¶ DUH
examples of such strategies that may not be easily monitored 
by the stakeholder. Therefore, we explored evaluating other 
combinations of strategies after setting the states of these two 
VWUDWHJLHVDVµ1R¶$V WKH WZRVWUDWHJLHVhave been eliminated 
from consideration, there are a total of 1024 combinations for 
further analysis. Combination of strategies implemented at a 
cost of 66.22 units results in the maximum net improvement in 
risk exposure of 108.24 units as shown in Fig. 5. 
Corresponding combination of strategies is shown in Table III. 
 
Fig. 4. Optimal combination of strategies for specific level of risk exposure. 
 
Fig. 5. Cost and benefit analysis of various combinations of mitigation 
strategies (after prioritizing strategies). 
TABLE III.  OPTIMAL COMBINATION OF STRATEGIES 
Mitigation Strategy Implement 
Effective maintenance No 
Visibility of demand to vendor No 
Proper company culture No 
Communication tools Yes 
Selecting the right quality material No 
Supplier assessment No 
Using correct quality programs No 
Training No 
Mass customization Yes 
Good contact with customer Yes 
Implementing the best technology No 
As per prevailing market conditions No 
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Managerial Implications 
This technique can help managers appreciate the impact of 
key risk triggers on associated risks and evaluate cost-effective 
mitigation strategies in accordance with their risk tolerance. 
The proposed method not only helps in identifying key risk 
factors and assessing risk exposure of a network comprising 
interacting risk factors, triggers and mitigation strategies but 
also presents a unique concept of evaluating different risk 
mitigation strategies through demonstrating cost and benefit 
analysis. One of the main merits of this tool relates to 
differentiating optimal combination of strategies from other 
inefficient combinations. Managers can take informed 
decisions taking into account the interdependent nature of risks 
and mitigation strategies. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Existing research in the field of SCRM has not fully 
explored risk evaluation stage of the risk management process. 
Specifically, the costs and benefits associated with various 
combinations of risk mitigation strategies have never been 
investigated. We have introduced a new modelling approach of 
determining cost-effective combinations of mitigation 
strategies taking into account the impact of these strategies 
across the risk triggers and risk factors. We illustrated our 
approach through simulating an existing case study and 
demonstrated its efficacy through conducting cost and benefit 
analysis. BBN based modelling helped capturing the involved 
uncertainty and the complexity associated with eliciting a large 
number of conditional probabilities was tackled through 
incorporating NoisyOR function within the model.  
The proposed approach is an important contribution in 
terms of introducing a new concept of evaluating risk 
mitigation strategies. The results clearly provided an insight 
into realizing the importance of adopting such an approach as 
implementation of mitigation strategies without performing a 
rigorous analysis would lead to inefficient outcomes. The 
process can also be used to select an optimal combination of 
strategies against a target level of risk exposure. The presented 
technique will help researchers and practitioners in developing 
and using efficient models of mitigating supply chain risks 
respectively. 
Though the technique has been illustrated through 
simulating an existing case study, nonetheless, it needs testing 
in real case studies in order to appreciate the associated 
challenges. Furthermore, in case of a huge network with many 
potential strategies, it might not be feasible to conduct cost and 
benefit analysis of all combinations of control strategies 
because of computational complexity. However, it will still be 
possible to evaluate the optimal combination through treating 
the clusters of risk triggers and interconnected risk factors as 
independent. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY VALUES  ܲሺ ௜ܶ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ȁܯ௜ሻ 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Y     0.1      
N     0.75      
 Y     0.05     
 N     0.25     
  Y     1e-05    
  N     0.01    
   Y     0.001   
   N     0.5   
         0.01  
    Y      0.05 
    N      0.75 
 
M6 M7 M8 T7 T8 T9 
Y   0.01   
N   0.25   
 Y   0.04  
 N   0.75  
  Y   0.05 
  N   0.5 
 
M9 M10 M11 M12 T10 T11 T12 T13 
Y    0.1    
N    0.99    
 Y    0.1   
 N    0.99   
  Y    0.0001  
  N    0.75  
   Y    0.0001 
   N    0.5 
  ܲሺܴ௜ȁ ௜ܶ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ሻ 
R1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 Leak Factor 
T 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.85 0.99 0.75 0.01 
F 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.15 0.01 0.25 0.99 
 
R2 T4 T7 T8 T9 Leak Factor 
T 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.75 0.05 
F 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.25 0.95 
 
R3 T10 T11 T12 T13 Leak Factor 
T 0.99 0.65 0.8 0.8 0.05 
F 0.01 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.95 
 
APPENDIX B. LOSS VALUES OF RISK TRIGGERS 
Risk Trigger Loss 
Machine breakdown 77 
Non-availability of raw material 44 
Labour problems 55 
Improperly trained workers  44 
1DWXUDOFDODPLW\DWYHQGRU¶VSODFH 1 
Failure to communicate 44 
/RZTXDOLW\PDWHULDOXVHGDWYHQGRU¶VIDFLOLWLHV 22 
,PSURSHUSURFHVVDWWKHYHQGRU¶VHQG 44 
Insufficient use of quality tools 44 
No clear market perception 99 
Poor after-service network 33 
Not using the latest technology 77 
High product cost 33 
 
APPENDIX C. COST OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
Mitigation Strategy Cost 
Effective maintenance 11 
Visibility of demand to vendor 11 
Proper company culture 22 
Communication tools 22 
Selecting the right quality material 11 
Supplier assessment 33 
Using correct quality programs 55 
Training 66 
Mass customization 33 
Good contact with customer 11 
Implementing the best technology 77 
As per prevailing market conditions 44 
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